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The Binding Force  
of International Legal Standards  




The intention of states and international organizations which make use of the instru-
ments of soft law, upon recognition of such conduct being in compliance with inter-
national standards, is to influence their mutual conduct in a normative, permissive or 
prohibitive manner. The practice of adopting acts that fall within the domain of soft law 
can help to revive international initiatives of a normative nature, allowing the extension 
of their use to instances of a higher or lower level. But acts of this kind can very well be 
used as acts of sabotage. It seems that one of the basic functions of such instruments is 
to create grounds for further work aimed at developing and formulating tools and solu-
tions belonging to the realm of the hard law, i.e they may constitute acts preparatory to 
subsequent decisions, at the same time, however, they do not constitute a legal basis of 
derivatives.1
Such instruments may also replace hard law in some cases (the role of substitution). 
In this case, the practice of soft law contributes to preparing the ground for the intended 
legislative process. Acts belonging to the sphere of soft law do not in themselves gener-
ate legal consequences, except that they must be more clearly defined at a later stage in 
the form of acts issued by the relevant institutions.2
1 T. Olawale Elias, Modern Sources of International Law, in Transnational Law in a Changing So-
ciety – Essays in Honor of Philip C. Jessup, New York – London 1972, p. 49; K. Skubiszewski, The 
elaboration of general multilateral conventions and of non-contractual instruments having a norma-
tive function or objective, “Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international” 1985, vol. 61(1), p. 101; 
M. Lachs, Some Reflections on Substance and Form in International Law, in Transnational Law..., 
op. cit., p. 109; B.S. Diallo, The role and place of soft law in the international legal system, in Wybrane 
problemy prawa materialnego i procesowego. Teoria i praktyka, ed. K. Konopka, J. Mucha, vol. IV, 
Poznań 2016, pp. 68-76.
2 For exemple the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as an agreement 
that is, among other things, “governed by international law” [Vienna Convention on the Law 
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The doctrine and the development of soft law
Soft law is a doctrinal concept derived from public international law.3 Originally con-
ceived as a set of sentences with an attenuated or non-existent binding force, soft law 
is now conceived as an encompassing concept capable of bringing together all phe-
nomena far from an idea of law as a system of norms sanctioned by the State. Soft law 
recommends a model of behavior to its recipients, a particular technique for formulat-
ing statements embodied in informal acts. In this sense, it differs considerably from 
the legal norm.4 Nevertheless, the recommended technique re-establishes links with the 
legal norm in the light of the functions it ensures; soft law is understood as an acces-
sory and subsidiary technique to hard law. Can this continuation of hard law by other 
means not be totally integrated with the legal order? The legal order makes soft law 
a graduated reception, which oscillates between the absence of consideration and the 
punctual acceptance of its effects. Soft law is generally excluded from the litigation of 
excess power because of its non-prescriptive nature, but when envisaged as a source of 
responsibility of the State in the context of unlimited litigation, subject to judicial review, 
soft law reflects the ambivalence of the international legal order. Soft law is a set of rules 
whose “jurisdiction” is discussed. They are non-binding rules of law, which is a priori 
contrary to the essence of the law. The concept of soft law finds application in particular 
in international law, environmental law, constitutional law and in contemporary laws.5 
of Treaties, Art. 2.1(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331]. This raises the question of what 
constitutes international law. The statute of the International Court of Justice is probably the 
most accepted source for a definition of what constitutes international law, and it lists several 
sources including “international conventions [...] establishing rules expressly recognized by 
[...] states” [Statute of the International Court of Justice Art. 38(1)(a); hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
Thus an agreement is a treaty if it is governed by international law, and international Law is 
defined as including treaties. It is generally accepted that an agreement is a treaty and therefore 
is binding under international law if the states involved intend it tobe so. Although one can 
certainly imagine ambiguities in this pragmatic definition and disputes among states about 
the legal status of an agreement, it is generally the case that the parties to an agreement have 
a shared perspective on whether it is binding on them.
3 R.R. Baxter, International Law in “Her Infinite Variety”, “The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly” 1980, vol. 29, no. 4, p. 549; J. Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, “Nordic 
Journal of International Law” 1998, vol. 67, p. 385; A. Pellet, Le “bon droit” et l ’ivraie – plaidoyer 
pour l ’ivraie (Remarques sur quelques problèmes de méthode en droit international du développe-
ment), in Le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes: méthodes d’analyse du droit international. 
Mélanges offerts à Charles Chaumont, Paris 1984, pp. 465-493. 
4 M. Virally, La distinction entre textes internationaux ayant une portée juridique entre leurs acteurs 
et textes qui en sont dépourvus, “Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international” 1983, vol. 60-I, II, 
pp. 166-257, 328-357. 
5 P.M. Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, “Michigan Journal of 
International Law” 1991, vol. 12, p. 420; S. Atapattu, International Environmental Law and Soft 
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A text creates soft law when it merely advises without a legally required obligation. Two 
categories of texts are used in the relations between the subjects of international law; on 
one hand, instruments creating legal obligations (treaties, conventions, agreements) and 
on the other hand, legally non-binding texts primarily expressing a political will.6 The 
second category includes declarations, resolutions and other acts of international insti-
tutions or conferences. This expression of the will of the subjects of international law, 
principally the States, which is not legally binding, is generally called soft law. Indeed, 
soft law rules can be found in treaties, which in their entirety are compulsory. Moreover, 
the increasingly frequent creation of soft law rules, embodied in formally non-binding 
instruments or in international conventions is one of the main features of current law. 
This is the case, in particular, for measures to protect the environment, for several rea-
sons. In the first place, unlike many other branches of international law, the environment 
concerns all areas of life within States, including economic activities, without necessarily 
affecting or even prioritizing international relations. Secondly, the protection of the en-
vironment implies the adoption of medium and long-term measures regulating matters 
that normally fall within the exclusive competence of States, such as the conservation 
of biological diversity.7 In most cases, these provisions require not only the adaptation 
of national legislation and institutions, but also the development of the capacities of 
local authorities to implement them and the allocation of the necessary funds for this 
purpose. As not only the resources but also the capacity to fulfill these obligations may 
vary from one State to another, the acceptance of „hard” obligations would be unreal-
istic, so that the adoption of soft law rules is „preferable.” Soft law appeared at a time 
when positivist theories were compelled to confront the regulation of new legal issues 
that formerly belonged to the domaine reserve. Since then, the academy has revisited the 
sources of international law in considering soft law as a source that questions the canoni-
cal basis of international law, thus breaking the ideal of hard legalization and introducing 
different degrees of normative intensity.8 Soft law has triggered doctrinal debates on the 
Law: A New Direction or A Contradiction?, in Non-State Actors, Soft Law and Protective Regimes 
from the Margins, ed. C.M. Bailliet, Cambridge 2012, pp. 200-226. 
6 A.E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, “The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly” 1999, vol. 48, p. 901. “The traditional sources of international 
law are frequently attacked as being too narrow, backward looking, and at any rate, incapable 
of coping with the modern problems of international relations”. V. E. Riedel, Standards and 
Sources. Farewell to the Exclusivity of the Sources Triad in International Law?, “European Journal 
of International Law” 1991, vol. 2, p. 58. 
7 R. Andorno, The Invaluable Role of Soft Law in the Development of Universal Norms in Bioethics, 
Paper at a Workshop jointly organized by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
German UNESCO Commission, Berlin 2007, www.unesco.de/. 
8 M. Virally, Sur la notion d’accord, in Festschrift fur Rudolf Bindschedler (Mélanges), ed. E. Diaz, 
Bern 1980, pp.  159-172; F.  Roessler,  Law, de facto agreements and declarations of principle in 
international economic relations,  “German Yearbook of International Law” 1978, pp.  27-73; 
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difference between soft law and hard law, rooted in positions adopted on the basis of the 
foundations or sources of international law or the process of lawmaking.9 Some authors 
rely on a binary distinction between legal and non-legal rules, while others choose the 
idea of graduated normativity, or a continuum, or the existence of a penumbra in which 
soft law has its being. Soft law instruments can even be adopted by new actors involved 
in the processes of informal international lawmaking, with different degrees of authority, 
as the new unacknowledged legislators of the world. Soft law also has different func-
tions, covering the inception of law and the interpretation and adaptation of hard law, 
and it is found in the delegation of functions conferred on international organs charged 
with developing international law. Soft law has even found its way into legal institutions 
and international organizations, endowing them with soft responsibility and soft instru-
ments of monitoring and enforcement. In light of these comments and despite its critics, 
soft law is here to stay.10 
Soft law as a privileged instrument in the actions  
of international actors
Soft law can contribute to the development of hard law or partially replace it, without 
exposing its sources, but at the same time, it compromises its integrity and rigor. Acts 
in the field of soft law are undoubtedly unusual, soft law may, however, serve as a kind 
of code of conduct in particularly complex cases, allowing the sphere concerning the 
application of legal provisions to be evaded, and thus to overcome the impasse. In order 
to better understand the substitution function of soft law, let us consider a resolution. 
In the absence of a sufficient amount of time needed to prepare the legal text or even 
the final shape of the agreement on all the proposed provisions, the parties concerned 
M. Bothe, Legal and non-legal norms. A meaningful distinction in international relations, “Neth-
erlands Yearbook of International Law” 1980, pp. 65-95. 
9 On the erosion of the sources enumerated in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, v. R.-J. Dupuy, 
observateur de la première heure du phénomène de la soft law, constate: “Si les âges classiques 
sont ceux des distinctions nettes entre catégories précises, l’effritement des colonnes du temple 
de la loi érigé par l’article 38 du Statut de la Cour exprime assez bien un des aspects des mu-
tations de la société internationale du temps présent.” R.-J. Dupuy, Droit déclaratoire et droit 
programmatoire – de la coutume sauvage à la “soft law”, in Communication. Colloque de Toulouse de 
la Société française pour le droit international, 16-18 mai 1974, p. 1. Cf. Declaratory Law and Pro-
grammatory Law: From Revolutionary Custom to “Soft Law”, in Declarations on Principles, a Quest 
for World Peace (Liber Röling), ed. R.J. Akkerman, P.J. Van Krieken, Ch.O. Pannenborg, Leyden 
1977, pp. 247-257. Cf. I.D. Seiderman, Hierarchy in International Law: The Human Rights Di-
mension, Antwerp 2001, p. 13. 
10 F. Chatzistavrou, L’usage du soft law dans le système juridique international et ses implications sé-
mantiques et pratiques sur la notion de règle de droit, “Le Portique” 2005, vol. 15, http://leportique.
revues.org/591.
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may, in accordance, decide to adopt the resolution. This element may contribute to the 
adoption of a temporary solution, which will later on be confirmed on the basis of hard 
law and replace the temporary soft law solution, which had a controversial form in any 
case. Finally, in addition to the two aforementioned features, a solution adopted on the 
basis of soft law can function as a companion act to institutionalization when the mat-
ters concerned overlap, but they cannot be dealt with using the same legal tools (we 
then talk about the additional role played by soft law). All three features described above 
place emphasis on the two main features of soft law, namely its imperative procedural 
aspect (requirements in terms of the need for this type of solution are not strict) and 
its “influential” nature. Both of these features may at first glance seem incompatible 
because of their coexistence with all its specifics.11 With regard to the first instruments 
characterized as „light,” it can be said that the fact there is a decision to choose one of 
these subsidiary legal instruments is also evidence of a reluctance to submit to the legal 
restrictions of hard law, due to the introduction of short and simplified decision-making 
procedures. The results achieved by referring to this kind of soft procedure would pos-
sibly be difficult to obtain under the procedures of hard law. Soft law, through its more 
or less programmatic nature, also creates a framework for future discussions and negotia-
tions between states. 
In this context it is possible to focus on the purely „symbolic” use of available pos-
sibilities, in order to avoid having to take decisions of a binding nature, which are thus 
likely to entail serious legal consequences. This solution makes it possible to establish 
a framework covering the individual, intermediate stages to reach a consensus and make 
a decision based on obtaining clean consent. This makes it quite obvious that it is easier 
for states to express their consent to the act, which has consequences in the form of legal 
obligations on a small scale. Consent also reflects the political interests of the parties that 
want in this way to demonstrate their support for specific fields of policy, and at the same 
time can do so without being involved at a purely legal level and without making any 
pretense or imposing on each other’s specific rights and responsibilities.12 
11 C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law : Development and Change in International Law, “The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly” 1989, vol. 38, p. 860. Cf. M. Fitzmaurice, The 
Identification and Character of Treaties and Treaty Obligations between States in International 
Law, “British Yearbook of International Law” 2002, vol. 73, p. 180. 
12 For exemple the Rio principle 7 “States shall cooperate in a  spirit of global partnership to 
conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the 
different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differ-
entiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear 
in the international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies 
place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they com-
mand.” See, e.g., Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (Geneva, 13 Nov. 
1979), 1302 U.N.T.S. 217, art. 1. V. also: Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer (Vienna, 22 Mar. 1985), UNEP Doc. IG.53/5, art. 1(2); Montreal Protocol on Substances 
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Thus, as we have seen, when an act situates itself in the sphere of soft law, it sometimes 
leads to the adoption of subsequent acts of a compulsory nature, which constitutes a first 
step towards developing a political consensus. Because the obligation arising under the 
agreement or contract concluded on the basis of soft law is a mainly a political or moral 
obligation, the resulting penalties and legal consequences are negligible. The fact there is 
no compulsory jurisdiction on certain rules of conduct allows states to make interpreta-
tions of their own, the fact being that it may sometimes be very convenient to removes 
some acts from the jurisdiction of the judiciary. For example, many of the provisions 
contained in the various codes of conduct defining international rules entail legal sanc-
tions due to insufficient clearly formulated content or the same type of conduct under 
regulation. In this context, there arises not only the danger resulting from differences of 
interpretation, but, more importantly, the danger of possibly violating the law, against 
which there would be no possibility of appeal. An international agreement, generating 
political, moral and legal consequences, must be approved by parliament. While the act 
of holding a political and moral obligation often includes relevant legal and character-
izes at the same time, a certain degree of precision and specialization, is not subject de 
facto to this procedure. However, it is the responsibility of each country to make a final 
assessment by reference to the constitutional law applicable on its territory, because the 
extent to which it can dispense with the procedure depends on parliamentary ratifica-
tion. Thus, for example, a specific agreement in one country might require the consent 
of parliament if it is to enter into force, another may well be included under the sole 
responsibility of the government. Acts governed by the rules of soft law contain a type 
of conditional or absolute clause ratification. Placing a  conditional clause is evidence 
of some kind of flexibility. Nevertheless, even in the case of a clause, absolute applica-
tion of the procedure for the implementation of the act is simpler than the procedure 
that usually takes place in the case of agreements and international law, which does not 
provide for the exchange of instruments of ratification. Mitigated, the nature of the 
procedure goes hand in hand with the “influential” nature of soft law. This seemingly 
paradoxical state of affairs testifies to the rank the soft law enjoys in international com-
that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal, 16, Sept. 1987), 26 I.L.M. 1550 1987), Pmbl, § 3; 
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (Helsinki, 17 Mar. 1992), 
31 I.L.M.1330, art. 1(c); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Rio 
de Janeiro, 9 May 1992), 31 I.L.M. 849, art. 1(1); Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki, 22 Mar. 1974), 13 I.L.M. 546, art. 2(1); Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources (Paris, 4 June 1974), 
13 I.L.M. 352, art. 1; Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 
(Barcelona, 16 Feb. 1976), 15 I.L.M. 290, art. 2(a) and all subsequent regional seas agreements; 
Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water courses (New York, 31 May 
1997), 36 I.L.M. 700, art. 21(2).
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munication or exchange, in spite of its only slightly binding nature. It is worth noting 
that in describing soft law as “influential,” we refer to an act regulating the principles 
of soft law outside its legal value in the strict sense of the word. An act is characterized 
by low binding power from a legal point of view, it may be quite binding politically and 
exert a strong influence on the international arena as a means of political pressure. For 
example, the opposition of a Member State to a particular act may force the State to 
remain on the defensive, entailing the need to clarify the position they occupy. But the 
act which regulated the principles of soft law may also be part of initiating the operation 
of a particular norms; a situation of this kind took place even in the case of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Finally, the act of belonging to the sphere of soft law 
may establish guidelines in previously pristine areas – guidelines which are designed to 
prevent such practices from occurring in a state based on selfish sovereignty. Both of the 
aforementioned features which characterize soft law, i.e either its mild or lighter nature 
and its “influential” character, reflect differences between the flexibility offered by the 
procedure and opacity in the impact of strength. Internationally, the dominant area of 
use and the application of soft law is the area of executive power. In this context, there 
is a paradoxical contrast between, on the one hand, the high levels of state authorities 
entitled to sign or approve arrangements made based on the criteria of soft law (heads 
of state and prime ministers, foreign ministers or other ministers, diplomats, or, in the 
case of when it is allowed, other officials), involving reciprocal obligations and justi-
fied represented in this way, and, on the other hand, the non-binding nature of these 
obligations of the states. Regardless of any legal dilemmas that inspire the practice of 
soft law from the point of view of procedural and conceptual practice, it is constantly 
growing and evolving, becoming an essential instrument for the exercise of political 
power. 
In light of the above, the paradox resulting from the frequent use of soft law can thus 
be summarized as follows: As soft law is turned to more and more often, an has farther-
reaching application, the strengthening of its legal and political status allows national 
governments to use an even wider range of its features in newer areas of activity in the 
international arena. By expanding the area of the application of soft law, which results 
primarily from legal tolerance, government actions are freed from coercion, parliamen-
tary oversight and jurisdiction, and can thereby shape political decisions at various inter-
national forums. In other words, despite the fact that acts concluded on the basis of the 
principle of soft law contain provisions about their specified range, legal acts are carried 
out without being subject to the requirements of the law in the case of international 
mechanisms – such as judicial review and mandatory approval by parliament – which 
essentially would be required by the rule of international law. The fact that these acts are 
carried out in isolation from the limitations of the existing international mechanisms 
gives governments considerable leeway to help them make joint decisions. Thus, the 
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increasing use of soft law instruments creates legal incentives for the creation and opera-
tion of a new type of rights.13 
On the one hand, the use of soft law may be seen as a manifestation of the fact that 
the decision-making structures operating at the international level do not have transna-
tional decision-making power, yet on the other hand it can also be understood as a kind 
of loophole in the area of cooperation between countries, which could provide a practical 
solution for the need to strengthen international legal order, where it shows a certain 
weakness or turns out to be simply ineffective.14 Soft law is a kind of gentlemen’s agree-
ment binding the parties, which increases the flexibility of their activities with regard 
to the political governance of their behavior or gives direction to their future actions. 
It is particularly appropriate in situations of insufficient competence and when there is 
difficulty in reaching a consensus. However, the risk of abuse of power in relation to the 
restrictions laid down by treaties, essentially for political reasons, might frustrate both 
the course implicitly recommended and the current decision-making procedure.15
The permissive nature of the international legal system  
in the face of the development of soft law
The blurred distinction between the nature of this international legal and political in-
strument raises the issue of border demarcation, which separates the doctrinal point 
of view of the field of public international law and international relations. Some legal 
experts point out that the use of soft law in some way carries the risk of the “juridifica-
tion” of international political relations. The development of specific standards at the 
international level is associated with a number of problems of a legal, political and tech-
nical nature. Paradoxically, the use of soft law is developing in a dynamic way, although 
this is not due to lack of precise provisions in the treaties relating to the policy area. 
In the doctrine, the introduction of the concept of soft law was considered as an at-
tempt to discourage countries from benefitting from hard law. “Infra-juridical” practices, 
13 J. Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, “Nordic Journal of International Law” 1996, vol. 65, 
p. 167. Cf. N. Luhmann, La confiance: un mécanisme de réduction de la complexité sociale, transl. 
S. Bouchard, L.K. Sosoe, Paris 2006; S. Beci, Environmental Protection in the Framework of 
International Law: Development and Perspectives, “European Scientific Journal” 2014, vol. 22, 
pp. 31-42; C.M. Chinkin, op. cit., pp. 850-866. 
14 K.W. Abbott, R.O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A.-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, The Concept of legali-
zation, “International Organization” 2000, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 401-419; K.W. Abbott, D. Snidal, 
Hard and soft law in international governance, “International Organization” 2000, vol. 54, no. 3, 
p. 453. 
15 T. Olawale  Elias, op. cit., p. 49; H. Thierry, Les résolutions des organes internationaux dans la 
jurisprudence de la Cour internationale de Justice, “Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit 
International” 1980-II, vol. 167, p. 442. 
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characterized by permissiveness in the application of the general principles of interna-
tional law, raise the concern that acts governed by the rule of soft law will replace the 
legal forms in their strict sense, which alone can guarantee the adoption of provisions 
which are supposed to be legally binding.16 Thus, there is a fear that acts of soft law will 
supplant the legal forms which alone can adopt legally binding provisions. When it 
comes to counteracting the propensity of actors (both public and private) to go it alone 
and, for the most powerful, to turn rules to their advantage, or even to seek to define 
them according to their own interests, international law may prove to be ineffective by 
favoring the use of non-binding acts. However, not forgetting the above risk of “juridi-
fication” in international political relations through these “infra-juridical” practices, the 
law can possibly evolve or even change in the customary manner. Normative diversi-
fication, which carries a soft law raises the problem of qualification and classification 
standards derived from these “infra-juridical” practices. Is soft law a normative category 
situated between the law and lawlessness? The prioritization of normative sources leads 
to imposing a formal order of priorities, so that conformity with the former constitutes 
the criterion of legality of the latter. A relatively orderly and rational rearrangement of 
the various acts practiced within the international legal system, without being tied to the 
definition of a prior hierarchy between them, would allow a distinction to be made based 
on their function and on the authority from which they derive. However, the variety 
of international “legalization” with which we are dealing shows that there is a missing 
hierarchy of norms and a source directory explicitly incorporated into texts; this is the 
consequence of the choices made by the international legal order. The pyramidal con-
cept of the hierarchy of norms (in terms of consistency and uniformity of the law by H. 
Kelsen) has been replaced by fuzzy standards, which lack clearly marked boundaries (the 
so-called «distributed» concept of law).
Conclusion
Acts are defined through the prism of their structures and effects, but in the global 
hierarchy occupied by each of them on the basis of the mutual relationship existing 
between them, their legal status is no longer clear. The use of one or other types of act 
is not associated with an existing possible difference between them in terms of legal 
status, but with the function and objectives, which is to be achieved with their help. 
Going beyond the concept assumes that the law implies the existence of a hierarchical 
16 D. Trubek, L. Trubek, The Coexistence of New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementa-
rity or Rivalry?, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Research Committee on the 
Sociology of Law, Paris 2005, www.reds.msh-paris.fr/communication/docs/trubek.pdf [access: 
31.07.2015]; A. Peters, Soft law as a new mode of governance, in The Dynamics of Change in EU 
Governance, ed. U. Diedrichs, W. Reiners, W. Wessels, Northampton 2011, p. 35. 
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system of normative functioning at the international level, meaning that the law can be 
defined not only as a system of a compulsory nature, but also as a system of a contractual 
nature. In the case of soft law, perhaps, one should speak not so much about legal rules, 
or what rules of conduct are agreed on by the parties in accordance with their wishes. 
Given the fact that these rules are not considered a source of legal obligations, they are 
rather a factor than a source of law. They activate the function of a political party, which 
is the exercise of authority in the field of “justifying and convincing.” Given H. Kelsen’s 
normativist view which holds that it is sufficient for a rule of law to prescribe that its vio-
lation should be punished for it to be considered a legal provision, this transfer to a right 
devoid of coercion or of a contractual nature, which results from soft law being used with 
increasing frequency, proves that it is necessary to separate the notion of the legal system 
from the notion of a legal penalty. In fact, the application of sanctions is a prerequisite 
for the effectiveness of the law, not its existence. In other words, the concept of coercion 
and consequently, the notion of sanctions is not a constitutive element, but a functional 
element of the international legal system. In the international context the question of 
international responsibility of the public subjects is of even more fundamental impor-
tance than ever before.
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summary
The Binding Force of International Legal Standards  
in the Face of the Recurrent Practice of Soft Law
Soft law facilitates cooperation between international actors. Already, the elaboration of 
international law is a matter of shared competence between States, traditionally recog-
nized as the only subjects of international law, international organizations and the typi-
cal actors. International organizations have initiated a movement towards the adoption 
of flexible forms of regulation of international relations. They will profoundly change 
the way in which international law will be created and presented to the recipients of the 
rule of law. From the very beginning of their activities, organizations preferred a method 
other than hierarchical command to encourage international cooperation. They will de-
velop a consistent legal technique, aimed at persuading and not compelling their Mem-
ber States to adopt conduct consistent with the legally binding standard. This article 
proposes a  reflection on soft law and the results of its increasing use in international 
practices.
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